The Supreme Court has taken up a case that could fundamentally alter the balance of power between the president and independent federal agencies, potentially granting the executive branch greater authority to remove officials who operate outside direct presidential control. This development stems from President Trump’s decision to fire Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter, a holdover from the Biden administration, prompting a legal challenge that now invites the court to reconsider the 1935 precedent set in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.
In that earlier ruling, the Supreme Court determined that President Franklin D. Roosevelt lacked the authority to dismiss FTC Commissioner William Humphrey solely for policy disagreements, reasoning that the FTC performed quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, not purely executive ones. This decision has long shielded commissioners at agencies like the FTC from at-will removal, allowing them to serve fixed terms—seven years in the FTC’s case—unless proven guilty of inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance. Critics argue this setup creates unaccountable pockets within the executive branch, where officials can pursue agendas detached from the elected president’s direction.
Hans von Spakovsky, a legal fellow at the Heritage Foundation, captures this concern vividly: “The Constitution says the president is the head of the executive branch,” von Spakovsky told Fox News Digital. “That means, just like the CEO of a big corporation, they get to supervise and run the entire corporation, or in this case, the entire executive branch, and you can’t have Congress taking parts of that away from him and saying, ‘Well, they’re going to keep doing executive branch things, including law enforcement, but you won’t have any control over them.’”
His analogy points to a core constitutional principle: the president’s role as the singular leader of the executive demands the ability to ensure alignment across all agencies. Without this, fragmented authority could lead to inconsistent enforcement of laws, where unelected bureaucrats wield significant power without direct oversight from the White House. This fragmentation, von Spakovsky implies, dilutes the democratic accountability that comes from electing a president to steer the government’s course.
The current case arose when Trump, upon returning to office, removed Slaughter and another Democratic commissioner, Alvaro Bedoya, in March 2025, citing the need to realign the FTC with his administration’s priorities. Slaughter contested the move, invoking the FTC Act and Humphrey’s Executor to argue her dismissal was unlawful without cause.
In a 6-3 emergency order issued on September 22, 2025, the Supreme Court permitted the firing to stand temporarily while agreeing to hear the merits, signaling a willingness to probe the limits of presidential removal power. This step follows a pattern of recent court actions, including a shadow docket ruling earlier in the year on labor board firings, where the justices distinguished the Federal Reserve as a unique entity but left room for broader application.
Joshua Blackman, a professor at South Texas College of Law, anticipates wide ripple effects if the court narrows or overturns Humphrey’s: “I think this ruling will necessarily reach beyond the FTC,” Blackman said. “The only question is whether they maintain that the Federal Reserve is different.”
Expanding on this, a decision favoring expanded removal authority could extend to other multi-member commissions, such as the Consumer Product Safety Commission or the Securities and Exchange Commission, where statutory protections currently insulate members from presidential whims.
For agencies enforcing regulations on everything from antitrust to consumer protection, this shift might enable quicker policy reversals, reducing the inertia that often plagues bureaucratic structures. Yet, as Blackman notes, the Federal Reserve’s status—described in court opinions as “quasi-private” with historical roots in early central banking—might carve out an exception, preserving its independence amid concerns over monetary policy stability.
This push aligns with the unitary executive theory, which asserts that the president holds complete control over the executive branch to fulfill constitutional duties. Proponents view it as essential for efficient governance, arguing that divided authority hampers the president’s ability to implement the will of the voters. Chief Justice John Roberts echoed this in a 2020 ruling on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, writing that the president’s power “to remove — and thus supervise — those who wield executive power on his behalf follows from the text of Article II.”
He added that the CFPB’s “novel” structure defied that presidential power because a single director oversees an agency that “wield[s] significant executive power.” Applying this logic to the FTC could dismantle barriers that allow agencies to operate as semi-autonomous entities, potentially curbing overreach in areas like regulatory enforcement.
As the court prepares for arguments in December 2025, the outcome could reshape the administrative landscape, empowering future presidents to more readily dismantle entrenched bureaucracies. For those frustrated with regulatory overreach, this represents an opportunity to restore executive accountability and streamline government operations, ensuring that agencies serve the president’s vision without undue insulation from electoral consequences.